Nietzsche's Greatest Challenge to Tradition: Part Two

Nietzsche’s unrelenting critique of the Western moral-metaphysical paradigm must be understood with the following distinction in mind: life as journey and well-being as consequence of that journey; joy as originating source of an active, creative, life. That truth and virtue constitute the path toward the ultimate human happiness is an obvious truism almost taken for granted in spiritual and philsophic matters. Another near-axiom grounding this project lies in the belief that the world is “imperfect,” or lacking, whether because it's always changing and full of vice, or because of "injustice." Questioning these premises usually result in some suspicion and counter-objections usually follow in short order in defense of these postulations.

Metaphorically speaking, the taste, color, and shape of this formulation changes from group to group. For instance, one may see it at play within the so-called “sexual revolution,” feminism, and the rising of global “democracy,” and calls for universal “human rights.” The forms taken are of little importance given that most people believe in the general validity of a mythological, and indeed teleological, “journey” toward happiness as well as the concomitant evaluation of worldly “imperfection” Within the scope of tradition we may seek to “better” ourselves in the solace and escape of religiosity or activist metaphysics, perahaps based upon a conception of a “beyond” or even an imagined future state of humanity. Another option is an attempt to reach an indifferent stillness “within” ourselves in relation to our environs, inspired by Hellenic and Buddhistic philosophy. Again, the particular variations on the main theme matter little when we look toward the origins, the “genealogy,” as Nietzsche may have put it.

That we’ve evolved over time the habit of our evaluations, and relevant here are those  of our world’s insufficient and fundamentally flawed character, is no testament to the veracity of this evaluation. The popularity of a concept, a scheme, a hypothesis, a story, a dream, is no demonstration of its being the case in actuality. Those who seek metaphysical escape in another world and those who seek to actively banish every vestige of suffering through political means are little different in terms of the origins of their various projects. Even more than religious people, the latter group, loosely called “humanists,” are particularly prone toward objection of this point, since they, more often than not, view themselves as more educated and less superstitious and ignorant than the former. Yet, the fundamental Western evaluation of the world as insufficient as well as the concomitant schema of sojourn-toward-future-happiness is as alive in “progressive” political agendas as any Christian devotee. As such, this “humanism” is, in the final analysis, the very same manners, customs and rules (the very etymology of morality!) as the religio-philosophical tradition in which it finds its “genealogy.”

Of course, each of us desire to rid ourselves of particular instances of suffering, both on the part of ourselves as well as the suffering of others. This, however, becomes an irrelevant protestation when considering the Nietzschean affirmation of life. Throughout Nietzsche’s work the palpable fact that suffering is an inevitable aspect of living, that the very conditions of existence, that is, ephemerality and limitation, will make suffering impossible for any living being to avoid. Even if it were possible to “live” eternally, conditions and things perpetually change in a reality forever in motion, always becoming. There simply is no standing still! (The question then remains, of course, whether or not “eternal life” then has any meaning at all if perpetual change eventually changes “you” to something completely unrecognizable to a later “self,” but, I digress.) What Nietzsche is saying to us, is that suffering is an inevitable characteristic of life and as such must be appreciated, most assuredly, not as a “thing-in-itself,” but as the condition of life itself. There’s simply no other possibility!

Two relevant points must be stated here pertaining to more contemporaneous critiques of Nietzsche. First, nowhere does Nietzsche come to the ludicrous conclusion from life’s inherent suffering, that we should, therefore, simply endure suffering for the sake of suffering “in-itself.”  This would simply be a restatement of Stoicism, in combination with the pessimism he openly and repeatedly criticized for various reasons.

Secondly, and in contrast to the view of certain pre-eminent philosophers, nowhere did Nietzsche uphold the notion that, in the course of living and the “discharge of power” it seeks, one should therefore consciously make others suffer. One simply cannot control the all outcomes of one’s actions, no matter how well-planned, within reality, which is always and everywhere made of innumerable things, persons, and the inter-relations between all. It is impossible in such conditions to guarantee that no one will suffer as a consequence of one’s actions. Thus, we find, for example, one source of Nietzsche’s sharp criticism of Mill:

“’Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you.’ That counts as wisdom; that counts as prudence; that counts as the basis of morality – as the ‘golden rule.” John Stuart Mill believes in it...But this rule does not brook the slightest attack. The calculation ‘do nothing that ought not to be done unto you,’ prohibit actions on account of their harmful consequences: the concealed premise is that an action will always be requited.” (WP  925)

There is simply no way to render all actions equal, or “reciprocal” (WP 926), as Mill seems to want it, within the conditions we are placed. Life is suffering, living and pathos are inextricable. Yet, Nietzsche would hardly contend that life is only suffering. Yet, the very fact of suffering is an indication of living and if living is to be affirmed totally, so must suffering. There’s simply no manner possible to us in which we may honestly separate life from suffering. 

Nietzsche's Greatest Challenge to Tradition: Part One

Yesterday the words came to mind as to why Nietzsche’s thought so deeply considered in these pages. I’d like to share my first thoughts with you.

I must admit that it's indeed because Nietzsche's thought is so profoundly different and, yes, at odds with the predominant Western tradition that his thought is abundantly represented herein. Now, many may take this admission as little more than a matter of glib, puerile, rebellion on my part, the “midlife crisis” of a man forty-two years of age. Some may even complain that it’s an easy matter on my part to carry out the process of undermining of a religio-philosophical tradition already on its way toward extinction at the hands of Islam, cultural-Marxism, nihilism, moral relativity, and so on. Nietzsche, after all, mounted a relentless criticism of the predominant Christian and Platonic stands undergirding the West over a century ago, did he not? Nietzsche simply inaugurated the decline through  rebellious stylistic maneuvering forming a “tradition” to which I adhere myself.

Of course, I must concede to these objections to some extent. That the Western tradition, as it has been understood for centuries, is disappearing there can be little doubt. There’s also no doubt as to the contrast between Nietzsche and the main strands of Western tradition in terms of style, since he didn’t bind himself to the formula (yes, the style) of logical argumentation and analyis so characteristic of the Western philosophic treatise. (I might here express the notion that Nietzsche’s stylistic techniques were more akin to writing music than the traditional philosophic treatise, but I digress.) However, my concessions of these points affirms neither the notion of a “mid-life crisis” on my part nor, more importantly, the underlying bases most often at play within detractions of Nietzschean thought as that found above. Such counter-critiques of Nietzsche’s thought simply miss the vital distinction within which Nietzsche’s project finds its origin and power. I’ve found  that, even those who ostensibly affirm Nietzsche’s thought fail to discern the contrasting distinction between the vast bulk of the Western tradition and Nietzsche’s work (the rare exception, of course, is that of Clément Rosset).

Nietzsche’s criticism of the Western tradition is undeniably founded in several perspectives differing in rank, and different “orders of rank,” as we might imagine him saying. This plaited heterogeneity of ranks and orders each mark an event, an appearance, of the  most vital theme running throughout the Nietzschean corpus: the total affirmation of life, the approbation of the real, or what I’ve termed joie. The variegated ranks and orders of rank (ordnung der Ranges) form a wide range of perspectival glimpses of this affirmation, from more distinct cases to sets (or orders). One may here utilize music (as parenthetically alluded to above), particularly the symphonic music of the latter half of the 19^th Century, as an illuminating metaphor: herein we find no not opposition between musical notation and the symphonic work as a whole, but a host of melodies, themes, movements, tones, pitches, interpretations, etc., within it and concomitantly as the work in question. All of these facets make up the symphony as a whole, sensed in all their simultanaity and inseparability.

Within the scope of the Western tradition, it seems uncontroversial to point out that a goal, a purpose, the telos, of a certain type of well-being, or human flourishing, has long been presupposed as the ultimate end of a journey. Was not the admonition “know thyself” (gnothi seauton) the clarion call sent out from Delphi across the ages to all who may come to ultimate wisdom, to truth, and heeded, more or less, by those who’ve come to form the long story that is our tradition? Far and away the vast majority of thinkers propose some type of well-being as the goal, the “end,” of whatever “means” they happen to employ as praxis.(*). It can hardly be denied that the notion of a journey, a progression, toward a sense of “true” well-being, is the predominant theme of the Western tradition. We may also feasibly, and with no leap in logic, also extend this paradigmatic notion as constituting the goal of nearly all of mankind’s main spiritual and philosphic traditions, if we take Karl Jaspers’ notion of the “Axial Age” with any seriousness. That we see time and again the rough formula of a journey: We originate our travels in the dissatisfactions and wretchedness of sensual, bodily, existence, later to find a path which we must ply toward lasting and “true” happiness, or eudaimon.  

It is precisely here Nietzsche’s challenge to the predominant tradition arises: Nietzsche’s eudaimonism (if I may use that term in a now broadened sense), is neither ending point nor result of some journey or set practices. On the contrary, and this is important: joy is the very beginning, the origin, of any “self-refinement,”  knowledge, and wisdom possible to us. Rather than seeking an escape from the tragic suffering inherent within the conditions of the constant change clear in every moment of our lifes, Nietzsche’s joyful affirmation is the full, unhesitating, acceptance of our ephemerality common to all reality. This is not merely an idle or “stoic” acceptance of reality, but an active love of it’s inescapable “Heraclitean” conditions (amor fati).

(*) Though self-proclaimed nihilists may disagree, I would add them to the list of the majority of thinkers in this regard, for reasons I won't expound upon at present.

On Qualities

“No quality embraces us purely and universally. If it did not seem crazy to talk to oneself, there is not a day when I would not be heard growling at myself: “Confounded fool!” And yet I do not intend that to be my definition.” – Montaigne

Within the course of discussions today, I’m often struck as to how divided people are in terms of how they view one another. It seems as if people are capable only of qualifying others in quanties of two: oppositions. Despite the constant calls for diversity in the “market-place of ideas” we tend to weigh one only against one other. If one is a “liberal” another who disagrees must, therefore, be a “conservative,” and vice versa. There’s “left” or “right,” “believer” or “non-believer,” “egoist” or “humanitarian,”... 

Yet, when one considers oneself in the course of everyday life, one is a multitude: a parent, a child, an employer, employee, manager, politician, a middle-aged man or woman, a shopper, a concerned citizen, a loving spouse, sick, healthy, in pain, free from pain, sad, a hominid, an ape, a soul, a child of God, happy, an atheist, a soldier, an officer, a patriot, a revolutionary, a free-thinker, matter, a mechanic, intelligent, rational, mistaken, a boob...Where we may sometimes allow ourselves the lightness of multiplicity, levels, scales and ranks, we more often weigh others by the morally laden scale of “____:” one and only one.Even the few who are capable of recognizing such diversity as themselves, fewer still are able to see it as others.

This is hardly a new phenomenon, however. Think in terms of the history of thought: how many philosophers and religious leaders play along these same lines? We’ve come to believe we must either accept or reject the thought and speech (if not the person) of another in toto, in order to reach the “truth” of a matter. It is through these falsified generalities décadence has become the norm, the tradition, the ethos, our habitus.

The Seductions of Professor James I. Porter: An Online Response

“Nietzsche’s stunning and stunningly provocative self-contradictions, which can occur within the space of a page or a paragraph, are notable in themselves, and it is pointless to deny their existence (just as it is pointless to indict them without pushing the question of contradiction to a sufficiently radical extreme).” Professor James I. Porter

As I’ve noted several times already I tend to read Nietzsche with an eye to the fact of his being a 19^th Century philologist, and it was with this in mind I ordered Professor James Porter’s Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future. I truly look forward to receiving the book. However, while I am awaiting its delivery, I thought I might browse the Web to see what other articles, talks, interviews, and so on, of Porter's that might be available to a layman like myself. My search quickly yielded this file (Note: the link contains copyright material) of one of Porter’s talks pertaining to Nietzsche (and from which the epigraph of this post is derived).

The talk begins with Porter admitting his talk is anti-Nietzschean, and manifesting this fact to the point of considering Nietzsche’s thought as so-called ““philosophy.”” That I included his quotation marks in my own quotation here indicates that Porter doesn’t consider Nietzsche a philosopher at all, which becomes increasingly apparent as the talk progresses. From the outset Porter characterizes Nietzsche as a shrill, “self-conscious poseur” who simply likes to seduce his audience and play on their fears. In addition, and as the epigraph above indicates, Porter believes concomitantly that Nietzsche is self-contradictory and Porter himself has not only read Nietzsche but understood the latter to a “T.”

I’m not attempting here to antagonize Porter, or portray him as a dishonest person necessarily, but I must admit to sensing within his contention an overly hasty and arrogantly presumed prowess and authority (again, as stated above) on Nietzsche. Quite to the contrary, I found that it’s almost as if he dulled his philological intelligence when reading Nietzsche in that neither context nor nuance seem recognized upon Porter’s usage of the Nietzschean corpus. Porter says as much about his own reading in what he leaves out of his citations of Nietzsche as well as what he reads into them (such as Nietzsche’s “voice” being “everywhere that of a falsetto”). I’d expect a closer reading by a professional philologist, and yet even my own layman’s reading challenges Porter’s noisy contentions, particularly that of Porter’s claim to the indubitability of Nietzsche’s “self-contradictions.” It is here I’d like to begin my critique of Porter.

One of the examples Porter uses to back his claim of Nietzschean self-contradiction is to be found in Twilight of the Idols (“Untimely Man”  10) where Nietzsche claims that “in the Dionysian state,” where the “entire emotional system is alerted and intensified,” we find “the essential thing” remaining is that we have “the incapacity not to react.” Porter contrasts this with Nietzsche’s claim a few pages earlier (“Germans” 6) that the goal, or end, of a “schooling in spirituality” within a “noble culture” is to learn how “not to react immediately to a stimulus.” It would seem a clear case of self-contradiction on Nietzsche’s part, except that Porter fails to perceive some rather blatant distictions lying within his own citations.

First, there is the explicit differentiation between the notions of “schooling” within a “noble culture” and the Dionysian state (zustande). Respectively, we have here the difference between a “social” undertaking an individual condition or “state.” Again, in “Germans 6” we see the “noble culture” educating individuals in three steps (seeing, thinking, speaking/writing) in the “ability to defer decisions” in “not react[ing] to every stimulus” and “every impulse.” Presumably, the “schooling” of this culture is to foster and facilitate a more frequent occurances of individual “Dionysian” states as found in “Untimely Man 10.”

Importantly, not only does Porter fail to catch the distinction between the “social” and “individual” at play within his own example, but he seems to also to miss the variance of directionality in them as well! The “schooling” of Nietzsche’s “noble culture” obviously emphasizes the educational activity moving toward individuals from an institution “outside” those individuals. The “Dionysian” condition, by contrast, is the “reactivity” of an individual from within himself, and after already learning how not to react to every stimulus the world offers up. Nietzsche illustrates this "inner" instigation when he invokes the image of "a certain type of hysteric" in the very same passage.

While Nietzsche’s notions of “schooling” within a “noble culture” and the “Dionysian” state contrast in their directionality and emphasis, they are interelated, and in this case I think are meant to form a tropic relationship: Dionysian individuals gather together as an institution in order to teach other individuals the prerequisite conditions to facilitate the possibility of their own  Dionysian state. It should be plain to see that these two cases cannot be be “contradictory” in any coherent manner, since they are to form a relationship, building upon one another, to form a whole.

I hope to continue my critique of Porter’s other claims in this paper in the near future. Part of my reason for dealing with Porter is that he raises some common objections to Nietzschean thought in general. However, when these objections (and I think them mistaken objections) are made by pedagogues who teach young minds to repeat those objections, I think it to best to show those interested otherwise. And in the context of Nietzschean thought that is never an easy undertaking, particularly since the prejudices against he and his work are so prevalent...

WWYD? A Question of Church and State

There are those who believe that without “God” and an afterlife, there would be no “morality” amongst men. Families and culture would simply fall into bellum omnium contra omnes. Yet, there are those who disbelieve in God (and “afterlives”) but also presume the appearance of the same consequences without the State, in that “society” would become non-existent.

My question: If in the absence of “church” and/or  “state” checks on your action, that is, if they aren’t “true”, would it follow that you would act as if “everything is permitted?”

Further: What does your answer say about your “character,” your strength, your life to now and its future, your very instincts? - You?

Just For A Moment...

Withhold your judgement for a moment and affirm, just for that moment, the atomic ground of Lucretius. Will you crumble and ask questions like: “What, then, is the purpose of living?” 

Are you simply incapable of such a suspension of judgement and concomitant affirmation and simply level the charge of "nihilism" against such a perspective?

Are you simply "indifferent" to such inquiry? 

Or will you sing and dance the annunciation of a new, joyful, aristocracy? A desire to create your purposes in seeking your definitions – In other words what one can do and what one may­ do become interwoven as your melody!

In the very least: the sirens who drone the libel of Romans 3:23 may find your ears full of wax!

-Joie

Today...

Greetings! Some time has elapsed since my last post. In fact, I’ve not posted since before the beginning of the year. I’ve not been slack, however. I just finished a wonderful work about Montaigne and his Essais (How to Live). I simply can’t recommend it highly enough, particularly to those who desire to live as an affirmation of life.

I’ve also been (re-)reading Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo with a German text in front of me to better read the said work philologically. In addition, I’ve been perusing his posthumous notes not only regarding the role of etymology in his work, but that of music as well. It seems the vast majority of commentators and critics, as well as most secondary work, places Nietzsche’s interest in music, as well as his own music, in the categorical hinterland of “hobby” or “amusement.” I tend to agree with Rosset that Nietzsche-the-philosopher emerged out of Nietzsche-the-musician (as well as Nietzsche-the-philologist) than vice-versa, or worse, that music was simply some secondary interest for Nietzsche. It is my hope that I’ll be able to write more on this in the near future.

Also, I’m looking to finish, or at least add to, my thoughts on the Three Evil Things in the coming days/weeks amongst other topics.

As to current reading, I’ve been busying myself with Epicurean philosophy, particularly in the form of Lucretius, and some of the “Transcendentalists”, like Emerson.

Today I’m under the weather, but my time in bed will be spent with De Rerum Natura and the Essais...

-Joie